Economic principals reporting:
...
The Post is clearly moving to preserve its independence. It is the Times which seems at risk, thanks to a go-for-broke strategy.
The news business is turning into a race among old champions and new
entrants, more quickly than most people realize. In the last few years,
Bloomberg and Thomson, both data-base businesses, have moved into news
in a big way. Bloomberg, which started life as a library of bond prices,
built its 2,000-person news service from the ground up over the last
twenty years. Thomson, which began life in 1934 with a single Canadian
newspaper, grew to a chain that included the Times of London,
before getting out of the newspaper business altogether, in order to
invest in financial services and legal publishing, Ten years later
Thomson came roaring back into the news business through the purchase of
the similarly extensive Reuters service. (A somewhat fuller account is here.)
Michael Bloomberg and David Thomson are each worth around $20 billion
– perhaps a dozen times more than all the Sulzbergers (of the Times) and Grahams (of the Post)
put together. Both companies have gone on hiring binges recently,
luring top reporters with promises of unspecified glories yet to come,
signaling their intention to enter the mainstream business one way or
another. David Thomson has told his editors
that he wants Pulitzers, and, presumably, so does Michael Bloomberg,
currently in his third and last term as Mayor of New York. Proclaiming a
new editorial approach is merely the first step As Michael Wolff pointed out the other day, the Financial Times, now owned by the publishing conglomerate Pearson, is probably the next big paper to go on the block. The New York Times’ market capitalization is about $1 billion, that of the Post about $3 billion.
What are the newspapers doing about maintaining their independence? The Post
has been cutting costs and buttressing its unassailability. Warren
Buffet, a long time investor to the company, took Ellison to lunch to
explain the logic of a “moated business”: a profitable one upon whose
territory others can’t encroach. What the Post has going for
it is a large and prosperous local market. He might have added that a
high penetration rate – many people read it, thanks to relatively low
prices – keeps advertising rates relatively high. Add to that an
intelligent and resolute chief executive, Katharine Weymouth,
granddaughter of the legendary publisher Katharine Graham. It just lacks
the dominant advertising monopoly it once enjoyed – and the swagger
that accompanied near-monopoly profits. Logic says that once its costs
are brought in line, the Post should be nicely profitable
again, and other geographical franchises – Los Angeles and Chicago in
particular – should eventually be strong as well.
The Times often seems to be doing just the reverse. As a national paper in competition with the WSJ,
it has many close substitutes, among readers and advertisers alike.
Its strategy seems downright reckless: keep staffing high, expand
various sections, price aggressively (a daily paper costs $2.50, vs.
$2.00 for the WSJ), and deepen the Web presence.. Late last
year chairman and publisher Arthur O. Sulzberger Jr. unexpectedly
propelled chief executive Janet Robinson into an early retirement, paying her nearly $24 million, according to a proxy statement mailed last week – apparently to assure her silence. The company sold its regional papers a few days later.
If these were the only considerations, you would have to admire the Times’
digital daring. Its website is superb. Its desire to compete as a
journalistic enterprise on a national or international level is as
strong as ever. And the daily newspaper itself, as former executive
editor Bill Keller said the other day, is what it is – a glorious aspiration, never quite achieved, against which all other efforts must be judged.
It is the revenue stream that is lacking. The Times hasn’t paid a dividend since December of 2008. Its stock is selling for around $6 a share. (The Post,
with about a twentieth as many shares, closed at week at $387. It pays a
$9.80 dividend.) Sulzberger cousins own around 40 percent of the Class
A stock (and an overwhelming proportion of the controlling Class B
shares). Carlos Slim, the Mexican cell telephone magnate, owns 17
percent; Fairpointe Capital, 11 percent; T. Rowe Price, 7.2 percent; and
BlackRock, 6.4percent. The Sulzberger cousins are not the Bancrofts,
who sold the Wall Street Journal to Rupert Murdoch; a sense of
public trust is in their DNA. But neither can the cousins afford to own
and operate their newspaper for free.
The owners of the Post have shown that they know what they must do to survive; in scaling back their ambitions, they may maintain their autonomy....
No comments:
Post a Comment